In six weeks, the anger of high school students has spread beyond school grounds. Starting in Créteil, it has reached Milan, Brussels, and Berlin. The protests center on overcrowded classrooms, the high cost of living, and conscription. At the same time, Russian networks are posting hundreds of coordinated messages, supermarkets are having their freezers hacked, and government websites are falling victim to denial-of-service attacks. There is no proof that Moscow started this fire. Everything indicates that it is fueling it. This article analyzes the mechanism through the lens of the European Strategic Compass—from the continental level down to your company—and shows why your legitimacy as a defense contractor is now also at stake in the streets.
The night of October 11–12, 2026. In several French supermarkets, control screens display abnormal temperatures. The temperature settings for refrigerated display cases and freezers were reportedly altered remotely, causing a break in the cold chain and the spoilage of food products in several hundred stores, according to some estimates. By morning, the shelves are empty.
Five days later, on October 17, high school students, former Yellow Vests, and workers took to the streets to protest the high cost of living. The total damage for this single day is expected to exceed that of the riots following the death of Nahel Merzouk in the summer of 2023, with initial estimates from insurance companies putting the cost at over one billion euros.
A coincidence? Perhaps. Investigators remain cautious: none of the sources consulted as of this writing formally establishes the exact method used. But for a defense official, the question isn’t who hacked into the freezers.
The question is how a breakdown, anger, and a narrative combine to influence the strategic choices of a continent that is rearming.
There is very real anger in Europe, and that is what makes it exploitable
From Créteil to Berlin: The Spread
In France, the movement began with specific demands. These demands focus on the shortage of teachers and staff, the physical conditions of schools, overcrowded high school classrooms, high school schedules, and the pressure associated with the Parcoursup post-baccalaureate admissions system. As of October 6, some 266,000 protesters—including high school students, college students, teachers, parents, and union members—had been counted by the Ministry of the Interior.
Then the movement spread beyond the school. On October 31, protests over high school students’ demands, the high cost of living, and racism brought together people’s anger across France for a third consecutive Saturday of demonstrations.
This is a Europe-wide phenomenon. Protests have taken place in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Albania, Ireland, Belgium, Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, Serbia, Luxembourg, Lithuania, and Poland.
Country Trigger Toggle Connection to national defense France High School Admissions, Parcoursup High cost of living, riots, looting One of the countries most targeted by Russian influence Italy Academic Requirements Truckers and farmers are joining the protest over diesel prices Slogans for education, against guns Germany Education Cuts Nearly 180,000 registered participants in 34 cities Military conscription among the demands Poland Crisis at the Constitutional Court Allegations of a “coup d’état” A Key Country in Supporting Ukraine
The common denominator: the portfolio
We must not misinterpret this. *The Economist* noted that the protests and riots centered primarily on “the cost of living and the deterioration of public services” and that right-wing narratives attributing the unrest to immigration, Muslims, race, and religion were inaccurate.
The economic situation is taking a heavy toll. In Italy, a strike by truck drivers—outraged by rising fuel prices following the war in Iran—has halted production of buffalo mozzarella and certain types of pasta. Severe fuel shortages and empty supermarket shelves have been reported in southern Italy.
Why Gen Z Is on the Front Lines
This generation protests without identifiable leaders and organizes itself through ephemeral networks. For analysts and prefects alike, this is a blind spot. Marion Solletty, author of *Agents of Chaos*, points out that detection is difficult, in part because it takes place on platforms like Snapchat, which operate in real time and where content disappears.
The movement extends beyond Europe. According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as of March 2026, there had been at least 120 “significant anti-government protests” in at least 73 countries over the past 12 months—the highest number since 2017.
Key takeaway: A movement without a leader, organized through ephemeral messaging apps and rooted in genuine grievances, is the ideal breeding ground for a power that wants to amplify its influence without being seen.
The Strategic Compass as a Framework for Analysis: The Hybrid Threat in Action
What the Union had already described in 2022
The EU did not first identify the hybrid threat in October 2026. In its Strategic Compass, it had already noted that both state and non-state actors use hybrid strategies, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and direct interference in our elections and political processes.
The 27 member states have planned a response. The Strategic Compass calls for the creation of a hybrid toolkit to address a wide range of such threats, including disinformation and cyberattacks. The EU will also establish a hybrid toolkit and response teams that bring together various instruments designed to detect a wide range of hybrid threats, as well as a cyberdiplomatic toolkit to respond effectively to a cyberattack.
Review the events of this fall using this framework. Every element is there: cyberattacks, disinformation, and pressure on political processes. The only new aspects are the scale and the fact that they occurred simultaneously.
Part One: Amplification on Social Media
The data is accurate. The NGO Alliance4Europe analyzed more than 500,000 social media posts. It identified a Russian network responsible for at least 600 coordinated posts prior to October 17, which have accumulated more than 7 million views.
This distinction is crucial: the high school student protests and the October 17 protests are French in origin and were not orchestrated by Russia. However, the report notes that as early as the beginning of September, fake social media accounts and fabricated news articles attempted to infiltrate the movement.
The methods are well known. These operations take the form of hundreds of fake news sites, anonymous social media accounts, and doctored videos that are becoming increasingly realistic thanks to artificial intelligence. According to Viginum, the “Storm-1516” operation is potentially coordinated by Russian intelligence.
Part Two: Cyber Pressure
At the same time, attacks are coming one after another. Pro-Russian hackers have claimed responsibility for DDoS attacks against ports, the defense industry, and the SGDSN. On the day of the mass mobilization, the CAF website went down on Saturday morning, and a pro-Russian group targeted the ANSSI. According to FrenchBreaches, more than 9 million people were potentially affected by data breaches on that single day alone.
Italy has also been targeted: On October 8, 2026, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially confirmed that it had suffered a cyberattack targeting its website.
There is documented evidence of state involvement. In July, the Cyber Crisis Coordination Center observed that French entities were being targeted and compromised using the Turla attack method, carried out by the 16th Center of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB).
The Analysis Scenario and Its Limitations
Let's start with the working hypothesis: a coordinated Russian influence operation. The pattern makes sense.
However, we must distinguish between what has been proven and what has not. FrenchBreaches points out that there is no public evidence to support the claim that the October 2026 attacks were directly orchestrated by the Russian government. And Kevin Limonier warns against going to the other extreme:
Claiming that the protests were instigated by foreign powers poses a fundamental political danger.
Why? Because overestimating the adversary serves its interests. Russian influence needs to appear all-powerful. Viginum also notes that the publicity surrounding these operations gives “greater visibility to content that is rarely seen by the public.”
The correct interpretation is this: the fire is localized, but someone is fanning the embers. Marion Solletty sums up the issue: Russia has made the weaponization of social marginalization one of its main levers of influence.
Poland, the Word “Coup d’État,” and the Art of Dividing the Union
A decade-old crisis that is flaring up
On October 30, Warsaw provided a scene never seen before. Riot police stormed the Constitutional Tribunal building in Warsaw, amid a conflict between Donald Tusk’s centrist, pro-European government and the nationalist opposition led by the Law and Justice Party (PiS).
The conflict has deep roots. It has been ongoing since 2015, when the PiS party appointed politically aligned judges whom neither Tusk nor the EU recognize. President Karol Nawrocki cut short his official visit to Senegal to arrive Friday evening at the courthouse, which was under siege by protesters.
Brussels has chosen sides. The European Commission has sided with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk by calling on Polish President Karol Nawrocki to approve the appointment of judges to resolve a deep political crisis in Warsaw.
Naming the crisis becomes a weapon
The term “coup d’état” is not a rumor. It is a political narrative promoted by the nationalist right. On its official X account, the Constitutional Tribunal denounced “a coup d’état” and affirmed that its president remained in office. This narrative has been around for a long time: as early as February 2025, the Polish prosecutor’s office had opened an investigation targeting Prime Minister Donald Tusk, after the president of the Constitutional Tribunal accused him, along with other senior officials, of acting as an “organized criminal group” to carry out a “coup d’état.”
The pattern is always the same. A judicial reform becomes a “coup d’état.” Social unrest becomes an “intifada.” Protests over the high cost of living become an immigration crisis. Each label radicalizes; each label spreads. The opponent doesn’t need to invent divisions: all they have to do is give them a name and spread it.
Tusk himself points out the Russian threat
The suggestion that the situation might be exploited does not come from outside observers. It comes from the head of the government in question: Tusk warned that pro-Russian groups could exploit the political conflict. The atmosphere is tense: the arrest of a man following a plot to assassinate the prime minister and the defense minister was reported around the same time.
It is important to note that, at this stage, no public source has demonstrated that Russian networks are amplifying the Polish narrative of a “coup.” This is a reported risk, not an established fact.
To force Europe to yield on Ukraine, or simply to divide it
The budgetary lever: “Schools, not weapons”
This is the crux of the matter for the BITD. In several countries, social protests are directly targeting defense spending. In Germany, the protests sweeping across Europe are inspiring young Germans, who are frustrated by the rising cost of living amid military spending and conscription. Among the six demands of Gen Z Regelt are the rising cost of living, cuts to education, and military conscription.
In Italy, “No Meloni Day” protesters are calling for more spending on education and less on weapons. The choice between “bread or guns” is being played out in the streets before it reaches Parliament.
For a hostile power, this narrative is very effective. It doesn’t require you to like Russia—you just have to think that rearmament is too expensive. It doesn’t change people’s opinions about Ukraine—it makes military aid feel like a cost that hits you every month.
To understand what is at stake for French manufacturers, take another look at our analysis of the updated Defense Programming Law and the position of defense SMEs: every billion allocated will now have to be justified to the public, not just to the Ministry of Finance.
Political leverage: dividing rather than convincing
Moscow does not need a pro-Russian Europe. A paralyzed Europe is enough for it. The current crisis illustrates this point: Donald Tusk, despite being one of the EU’s most anti-Kremlin leaders, has drawn a link between the riots and immigration. He stated that Poland “would not pay the price for the mistakes of other states,” leaving France and Spain isolated on migration policy.
The same scenario is playing out elsewhere. Italian Education Minister Giuseppe Valditara stated that “the situation in Italy is very different from that in France,” echoing a far-right argument. Every capital city claims that the turmoil is coming from its neighbor. Each time, European solidarity takes a step backward.
Jean-Marie Colombani sums it up in a podcast for Slate: Russia is the prime suspect in the spread of viral videos on these platforms, as part of its ongoing goal to “weaken, or even destroy, the European Union.”
The U.S. factor: a second key player not to be overlooked
An honest analysis cannot stop at Moscow. Experts interviewed by Le Grand Continent describe a convergence between part of the MAGA movement and Russia on the theme of European decline, albeit through different means: overt support on one side, covert operations on the other. U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance have criticized the protests, and Donald Trump has attributed the unrest in France to immigration.
What this means for you: The information front does not have just one adversary. Your messages must hold their own against several competing narratives.
A Look Back at France: A Nation Under Pressure on Several Fronts
Why France Is a Priority Target
According to Marion Solletty, on the Russian side, there is an obsession with the idea that France and Europe threaten the very integrity of Russia’s imperial structure. She explains that France is targeted because of its military power and its leading role in the coalition of volunteers, but also because of its great weakness: polarization and internal divisions.
The 2027 deadline exacerbates the risk. Operations have already begun: Édouard Philippe, Raphaël Glucksmann, and Gabriel Attal—three presidential candidates—all have one thing in common: they were the targets of cyberattacks between late July and early August.
A country that must hold its ground on three fronts at once
Maintaining public order requires considerable resources. French authorities announced the deployment of 70,000 police officers on Saturday, following some of the worst riots in decades. The government is also facing criticism for its tactics: several high school students have been seriously injured, and the IGPN has opened dozens of investigations.
Public order, cyber defense, budgetary discipline: a government that must manage everything at once is forced to make trade-offs. And when faced with such trade-offs, defense programs become the most tempting variable to cut.
BITD Companies: Four Specific Risks
The overall analysis reveals a very concrete reality for your company. Here are the four risks you should assess right away.
Risk No. 1: Reputation, or becoming a symbol of “arms dealers”
In a narrative that pits weapons against bread, the defense contractor becomes an easy target. Your production facility, your financial results, and your government contracts can all be used against you in a single viral post. The risk isn’t just facing a campaign—it’s being absent from the debate when it begins.
Risk No. 2: Cybersecurity and Physical Security
The defense industry has already been targeted by pro-Russian groups this fall. France was already at risk: in June 2026, Microsoft ranked France among the eight NATO countries most frequently targeted by cyberattacks originating in Russia. A small or medium-sized subcontractor is often the easiest link through which to reach a large prime contractor.
Attacks on large retail chains also show that connected industrial systems—such as automated control systems and regulation systems—are now targets. To develop your response, refer to our analysis of the BITD’s DRSD security guide for small and medium-sized businesses.
Risk No. 3: Recruiting a Skeptical Gen Z
The generation protesting against conscription in Berlin is the very one you’re trying to recruit as engineers, technicians, or operators. If your business is perceived as running counter to their priorities (education, climate, purchasing power), your appeal will plummet before you even get to the interview.
The answer lies in these key concepts: sovereignty, protection, and skilled jobs in local communities. We’ve outlined this approach in our article on employer branding in the context of the war for defense engineering talent.
Risk No. 4: Production Continuity in a War Economy
Roadblocks, fuel shortages, strikes, disrupted operations: the example from Italy shows that a social movement can disrupt supply chains in a matter of days. For an SME operating on tight production schedules, every day of downtime undermines its industrial credibility. This issue falls under the purview of governance, as we explain in our analysis of the industrialization and governance of defense SMEs in a wartime economy.
Risk Weak signal to monitor Priority Response Image Negative mentions of your industry in protest hashtags Local News Story Ready for Broadcast Cybersecurity and Safety DDoS Attacks Targeting Defense Systems Audit, crisis management procedures, sovereign messaging Recruitment Decline in Applications from People Under 25 Meaning-Based Employer Branding Continuity Calls for a blockade in your logistics hub Business Continuity Plan, Buffer Inventories
What to Do: A Communications Response Plan for Leaders
1. Advocate for the social value of your business without resorting to propaganda
The narrative of “weapons versus bread” is based on a false dichotomy. Your role is to show that this dichotomy does not hold true in your region: skilled jobs, trained apprentices, local subcontractors, and protection of the population. Local, verifiable facts are more convincing than grand speeches about sovereignty.
2. Don't leave the field empty
Silence is not neutral. In an era of information warfare, the space you don’t occupy is taken by others. Leaders who speak out regularly and with restraint build credibility that protects them when the storm hits. That is the crux of our analysis of the cost of silence among BITD leaders on LinkedIn.
3. Prepare for the crisis before it finds you
- Monitor the narratives—not just mentions of your brand—and keep an eye on how your industry is portrayed in public discourse.
- A ready-to-use crisis response procedure, with approved first-response messages, designated spokespersons, and a streamlined decision-making process.
- Secure internal channels, so your employees hear your side of the story before they hear it on social media.
- A rule of caution regarding attribution. Never publicly accuse a foreign power without evidence: you would be giving your adversary the visibility it seeks.
A brand doesn't protect itself by hiding. It protects itself by having been credible before the crisis.
Conclusion: Trust as a Strategic Asset
Let’s summarize. European anger is real, and it is fueled by the cost of living and the deterioration of public services. A hostile power is exploiting this anger by amplifying it on social media, applying cyber pressure, and capitalizing on political divisions, from Paris to Warsaw. Its goal is not necessarily to change Europe’s stance on Ukraine: dividing Europe and making rearmament unpopular is enough for it.
For companies in the BITD sector, the implication is clear. Your legitimacy, your appeal, and your business continuity now depend on your ability to engage in public discourse and weather a reputational crisis. This requires methodically building trust before you need it.
That is precisely the purpose of Autour de l’Image ’s “Capital Confiance & Expérience” program: to map out your reputational vulnerabilities, build a narrative that holds up against attacks, prepare your crisis management strategies, and align your stakeholders (customers, employees, local communities) before others tell your story for you.
